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Abstract—Recently, an opinion dynamics model has been
proposed to describe a network of individuals discussing a set
of logically interdependent topics. For each individual, the set
of topics and the logical interdependencies between the topics
(captured by a logic matrix) form a belief system. We investigate
the role the logic matrix and its structure plays in determining
the final opinions, including existence of the limiting opinions, of
a strongly connected network of individuals. We provide a set
of results that, given a set of individuals’ belief systems, allow a
systematic determination of which topics will reach a consensus,
and which topics will disagreement in arise. For irreducible logic
matrices, each topic reaches a consensus. For reducible logic
matrices, which indicates a cascade interdependence relationship,
conditions are given on whether a topic will reach a consensus
or not. It turns out that heterogeneity among the individuals’
logic matrices, including especially differences in the signs of the
off-diagonal entries, can be a key determining factor. This paper
thus attributes, for the first time, a strong diversity of limiting
opinions to heterogeneity of belief systems in influence networks,
in addition to the more typical explanation that strong diversity
arises from individual stubbornness.
Index Terms—opinion dynamics, social networks, multi-agent
systems, influence networks, agent-based models, networked
systems
I. INTRODUCTION
THERE has been great interest over the past few yearsin agent-based network models of opinion dynamics
that describe how individuals’ opinions on a topic evolve
over time as they interact [1], [2]. The seminal discrete-time
French–Harary–DeGroot model [3]–[5] (or DeGroot model
for short) assumes that each individual’s opinion at the next
time step is a convex combination of his/her current opinion
and the current opinions of his/her neighbours. This weighted
averaging aims to capture social influence, where individuals
exert a conforming influence on each other so that over
time, opinions become more similar (and thus giving rise to
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the term “influence network”). For networks satisfying mild
connectivity conditions, the opinions reach a consensus, i.e.
the opinion values are equal for all individuals.
Since then, and to reflect real-world networks, much focus
has been placed on developing models of increasing sophis-
tication to capture different socio-psychological features that
may be involved when individuals interact. The Hegselmann–
Krause model [6]–[9] introduced the concept of bounded
confidence, which is used to capture homophily, i.e. the phe-
nomenon whereby individuals only interact with those other
individuals whose opinion values are similar to their own. The
Altafini model [10]–[13] introduced negative edge weights
to model antagonistic or competitive interactions between
individuals (perhaps arising from mistrust). An individual’s
propensity to assimilate information in a biased manner, by
more heavily weighting opinions close to his or her own, is
studied in [14]. The Friedkin–Johnsen model generalised the
DeGroot model by introducing the idea of “stubbornness”,
where an individual remains (at least partially) attached to his
or her initial opinion [15], [16]. Of particular note is that the
DeGroot and Friedkin–Johnsen models have been empirically
examined [16]–[18]. For more detailed discussions on opinion
dynamics modelling, we refer the reader to [1], [2], [19].
Recently in [20], a multi-dimensional extension to the
Friedkin–Johnsen was proposed to describe a network of
individuals who simultaneously discuss a set of logically in-
terdependent topics. That is, an individual’s position on Topic
A may influence his/her position on Topic B due to his/her
view of constraints or relations between the two topics. Such
interdependencies are captured in the model by a “logic ma-
trix”. This interdependence can greatly shift the final opinion
values on the set of topics since now the interdependencies and
the social influence from other individuals both affect opinion
values. The model is used in [21] to explain that the shift in
the US public’s opinions on the topic of whether the 2003
Invasion of Iraq was justified was due to shifting opinions on
the logically interdependent topic of whether Iraq had weapons
of mass destruction. The set of topics, the interdependent
functionalities between the topics, and the mechanism by
which an individual processes such interdependencies forms
a “belief system” as termed by Converse in his now classical
paper [22]. For networks where all individuals have the same
logic matrix, a complete stability result is given using algebraic
conditions in [20] and using graph-theoretic conditions in [23].
Of course, the assumption that all individuals have the same
logic matrix is restrictive. Heterogeneous logic matrices were
considered in [21], but at least one individual is required to
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2exhibit stubbornness in order to obtain a stability result.
This paper will also consider a generalisation of the multi-
dimensional model proposed in [20] for the evolution of opin-
ions in belief systems, going beyond [20], [21] by analysing
the effects of the logic matrix, including especially heterogene-
ity of the logic matrices among the individuals, on the limiting
opinion distribution. We first establish a general convergence
result for the model with heterogeneous logic matrices on
strongly connected networks. Then, we provide a set of results
which enables the systematic determination of whether for
a given topic, the opinions of the individuals will reach a
consensus, or will reach a state of persistent disagreement.
We find that the nature of the heterogeneity of the logic
structure among the individuals, viz. the logical interdepen-
dencies between topics, and the structure itself, plays a major
role in determining whether opinions on a given topic reach a
consensus or fail to do so. If the logical interdependencies
do not have a cascade structure, then consensus is always
secured. When the logical interdependencies have a cascade
structure, and by considering topics at the top of a cascade
structure to be axiom(s) that an individual’s belief system
is built upon, we establish that discussion of the axiomatic
topics will lead to a consensus. In contrast, we discover that
persistent disagreement can arise in the topics at the bottom
of the cascade when certain types of heterogeneity exist in the
logic matrices. A preliminary work [24] considers the special
case of lower triangular logic matrices, but we go well beyond
that in this paper by considering general logic matrix structures
and providing a comprehensive account of the results.
We discover that if there is a failure to reach a consensus,
then it is typically not minor; in general a strong diversity
of opinions will eventually emerge. In more detail, a network
is said to exhibit weak diversity [25] if opinions eventually
converge into clusters where there is no difference between
opinions in the same cluster (consensus is the special case of
one single cluster). Strong diversity occurs when the opinions
converge to a configuration of persistent disagreement, with
a diverse range of values (there may be clusters of opin-
ions with similar, but not equal, values within a cluster).
Weak diversity is a common outcome in the Hegselmann–
Krause model, with the network becoming disconnected into
subgroups associated with the clusters. In strongly connected
networks, weak diversity also emerges in the Altafini model
(specifically polarisation of two opinion clusters) when the
network is “structurally balanced”. However, sign reversal of
some selected edges may destroy the structural balance of
the network, causing the opinions to converge to a consensus
at an opinion value of zero, indicating that the polarisation
phenomenon is not robust to changes in the network structure.
There has been a growing interest to study models which are
able to capture the more realistic outcome of strong diversity
in networks which remain connected [25], [26]. The DeGroot
model shows that social influence in a connected network
acts to bring opinions closer together until a consensus is
achieved, meaning some other socio-psychological process
must be at work to generate strong diversity. The Friedkin–
Johnsen model attributes strong diversity to an individual’s
stubborn attachment to his/her initial opinion [15]. In contrast,
[27] considers a model where an individual’s susceptibility
to interpersonal influence is dependent on the individual’s
current opinion; strong diversity is verified as a special case.
The papers [25], [26] consider two features that might give
rise to strong diversity, the first being “social distancing”,
and the second being an individual’s “desire to be unique”.
Experimental studies are inconclusive with regards to the
existence of ubiquitous and persistent antagonistic interper-
sonal interactions (there might be limited occurrences in the
network over short time spans) [20], while it is unlikely that
an individual has the same level of stubborn attachment to his
or her initial opinion value for months or years.
In contrast to these works, we identify for the first time
in the literature that strong diversity can arise because of
the structure of individuals’ belief systems, and show that
heterogeneity among belief systems plays a crucial role. In
the model, each individual is concurrently undergoing two
driver processes; individual-level belief system dynamics to
secure logical consistency of opinions across a set of topics,
and interpersonal influence to reach a consensus. Our findings
explain that when the two drivers do not interfere with each
other, a consensus is reached, whereas conflict between the
two drivers leads to persistent disagreement even though all
individuals are trying to reach a consensus. This gives a new
and illuminating perspective as to why strong diversity can
last for extended periods of time in connected networks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II,
we provide notations, an introduction to graph theory and
the opinion dynamics model. At the same time, a formal
problem statement is given. The main results are presented
in Section III, with simulations given in Section IV for
illustration, and conclusions in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND AND FORMAL PROBLEM STATEMENT
We begin by introducing some mathematical notations used
in the paper. The (i, j)th entry of a matrix M is denoted mij .
A matrix A is said to be nonnegative (respectively positive)
if all aij are nonnegative (respectively positive). We denote
A as being nonnegative and positive by A ≥ 0 and A > 0,
respectively. A matrix A ≥ 0 is said to be row-stochastic
(respectively, row-substochastic) if there holds
∑n
j=1 aij =
1,∀i (respectively, if there holds ∑nj=1 aij ≤ 1,∀i and ∃k :∑n
j=1 akj < 1). The transpose of a matrix M is denoted by
M>. Let 1n and 0n denote, respectively, the n × 1 column
vectors of all ones and all zeros. The n× n identity matrix is
given by In. Two matrices A ∈ Rn×m and B ∈ Rn×m are
said to be of the same type, denoted by A ∼ B, if and only
if aij 6= 0 ⇔ bij 6= 0. The Kronecker product is denoted by
⊗. The infinity norm and spectral radius of a square matrix
A is ‖A‖∞ and ρ(A), respectively. A square matrix A ≥ 0
is primitive if ∃k ∈ N : Ak > 0 [28, Definition 1.12].
A. Graph Theory
The interaction between n individuals in a social network,
and the logical interdependence between topics can modelled
using a weighted directed graph. To that end, we introduce
some notations and concepts for graphs. A directed graph
3G[A] = (V, E ,A) is a triple where node vi is in the
finite, nonempty set of nodes V = {v1, . . . , vn}. The set of
ordered edges is E ⊆ V × V . We denote an ordered edge
as eij = (vi, vj) ∈ E , and because the graph is directed, in
general the existence of eij does not imply existence of eji.
An edge eij is said to be outgoing with respect to vi and
incoming with respect to vj . Self-loops are allowed, i.e. eii
may be in E . The matrix A ∈ Rn×n associated with G[A]
captures the edge weights. More specifically, aij 6= 0 if and
only if eji ∈ E . If A is nonnegative, then all edges eij have
positive weights, while a generic A may be associated with a
signed graph G[A], having signed edge weights.
A directed path is a sequence of edges of the form
(vp1 , vp2), (vp2 , vp3), . . . where vpi ∈ V are unique, and
epipi+1 ∈ E . Node i is reachable from node j if there
exists a directed path from vj to vi. A graph is said to be
strongly connected if every node is reachable from every other
node. A square matrix A is irreducible if and only if the
associated graph G[A] is strongly connected. A directed cycle
is a directed path that starts and ends at the same vertex, and
contains no repeated vertex except the initial (which is also the
final) vertex. The length of a directed cycle is the number of
edges in the directed cyclic path. A directed graph is aperiodic
if there exists no integer k > 1 that divides the length of every
directed cycle of the graph [28]. Note that any graph with a
self-loop is aperiodic.
A signed graph G is said to be structurally balanced (respec-
tively structurally unbalanced) if the nodes V = {v1, . . . vn}
can be partitioned (respectively cannot be partitioned) into two
disjoint sets such that each edge between two nodes in the
same set has a positive weight, and each edge between nodes
in different sets has a negative weight [29].
The following is a useful result employed in the paper.
Lemma 1 ([28, Proposition 1.35]). The graph G[A], withA ≥
0, is strongly connected and aperiodic if and only if A is
primitive.
Note that the irreducibility of A (implied by the strong
connectivity property of G[A]) implies that if a k exists such
that Ak > 0, then Aj > 0 for all j > k.
B. The Multi-Dimensional DeGroot Model
In this paper, we investigate a recently proposed multi-
dimensional extension to the DeGroot and Friedkin-Johnsen
models [20], [21], which considers the simultaneous discus-
sion of logically interdependent topics.
Formally, consider a population of n individuals discussing
simultaneously their opinions on m topics, with individual
and topic index set I = {1, . . . , n} and J = {1, . . . ,m},
respectively. Individual i’s opinions on the m topics at time
t = 0, 1, . . ., are denoted by xi(t) = [x1i (t), . . . , x
m
i (t)]
> ∈
Rm. In this paper, we adopt a standard definition of an opinion
[21]. In particular, xpi (t) ∈ [−1, 1] is individual i’s attitude
towards topic p, which takes the form of a statement, with
xpi > 0 representing i’s support for statement p, x
1
i < 0
representing rejection of statement p, and xpi = 0 representing
a neutral stance. The magnitude of xpi denotes the strength
of conviction, with |xpi | = 1 being maximal support/rejection.
Mild assumptions are placed on the network and individual
parameters in the sequel to ensure that xpi (t) ∈ [−1, 1] for all
t ≥ 0, and thus the opinion values are always well defined.
In the multi-dimensional DeGroot model, xi(t) evolves
according to
xi(t+ 1) =
n∑
j=1
wijCixj(t), (1)
where the nonnegative scalar wij represents the influence
weight individual i accords to the vector of opinions of
individual j. Thus, the influence matrix W , with (i, j)th entry
wij , can be used to define the graph G[W ] that describes
the interpersonal influences of the n individuals. We assume
that wii > 0 for all i ∈ I and
∑n
j=1 wij = 1 for all
i ∈ I, which implies that W is row-stochastic. The matrix
Ci, with (p, q)th entry cpq,i, is termed the logic matrix. In
[20], [21], the authors elucidate that Ci represents the logical
interdependence between the m topics as seen by individual
i. We note that the Ci are assumed to be heterogeneous (i.e.
∃i, j : Ci 6= Cj). Indeed, a critical aspect of this paper is to
study how the structure of the Cis, especially heterogeneity,
can determine whether certain topics have opinions that reach
a consensus or a persistent disagreement.
We now illustrate with a simple example how Ci is used
by individual i to obtain a set of opinions consistent with any
logical interdependencies between each topic, and in doing so,
motivate that certain constraints must be imposed on Ci due to
the problem context (these constraints are implicitly imposed
in [20], [21], but without motivation).
Suppose that there are two topics. Topic 1: The exploration
of Space is important to mankind’s future. Topic 2: The
exploration of Space should be privatised. Using Topic 1
as an example, and according to the definition of an opin-
ion given above Eq. (1), x1i = 1 represents individual i’s
maximal support of the importance of Space exploration,
while x1i = −1 represents maximal rejection that Space
exploration is important. Now, suppose that individual i has
xi(0) = [1,−0.2]>, i.e. individual i initially believes with
maximal conviction that Space exploration is important and
initially believes with some (but not absolute) conviction that
Space exploration should not be privatised1. Let
Ci =
[
1 0
0.5 0.5
]
. (2)
This tells us that individual i’s opinion on the importance of
Space exploration is unaffected by his or her own opinion on
whether Space exploration should be privatised. On the other
hand, individual i’s opinion on Topic 2 depends positively
on his or her own opinion on Topic 1, perhaps because
individual i believes privatised companies are more effective.
In the absence of opinions from other individuals, individual
i’s opinions evolves as
xi(t+ 1) = Cixi(t), (3)
1Note that we do not require Ci to be row-stochastic and nonnegative,
though the Ci of this example is.
4which yields limt→∞ xi(t) = [1, 1]>, i.e. individual i eventu-
ally believes that Space exploration should be privatised. Thus,
xi(t) moves from xi(0) = [1,−0.2]>, where individual i’s
opinions are inconsistent with the logical interdependence as
captured by Ci, to the final state xi(∞) = [1, 1]>, which is
consistent with the logical interdependence. Eq. (3), with opin-
ion vector xi(t) and the logical interdependencies captured
by Ci, models individual i’s belief system. (We explained
qualitatively what a belief system was in the Introduction, and
have now given the mathematical formulation.)
In general, one might expect, as do we in this paper, that an
individual’s belief system without interpersonal influence from
neighbours will eventually become consistent. For a topic p
which is independent of all other topics, one also expects that
xpi (t + 1) = x
p
i (t) for all t. To ensure the belief system is
consistent, we impose the following assumption.
Assumption 1. The matrix Ci, for all i ∈ I, is such that each
eigenvalue of Ci is either 1 or has modulus less than 1. If an
eigenvalue of Ci is 1, then it is semi-simple2. For all i ∈ I
and p ∈ J , there holds ∑mq=1 |cpq,i| = 1, and the diagonal
entries satisfy cpp,i > 0.
The assumptions on the eigenvalues of Ci ensure that
Eq. (3) converges to a limit, and are necessary and sufficient
for individual i’s belief system to eventually become consis-
tent. The other assumptions lead to desirable properties for
the system Eq. (1). Specifically, the reasonable assumption that
cpp,i > 0 means topic p is positively correlated with itself. The
constraint
∑m
q=1 |cpq,i| = 1 for all i ∈ I and p ∈ J ensures
that xpi (0) ∈ [−1, 1] implies xpi (t) ∈ [−1, 1] for all t ≥ 0 (see
[20]), and also implies that if topic p is independent of all
other topics, i.e. cpq,i = 0 for all q 6= p, then cpp,i = 1. The
well-studied special case where topics are totally independent
is Ci = Im. We are now in a position to formally define this
paper’s objective.
C. Objective Statement
This paper is focused on establishing the effects of the set of
logic matrices Ci, i ∈ I on the evolution of opinions, and in
particular the limiting opinion configuration. First, we record
two assumptions on the logic matrix and the network topology,
which will hold throughout this paper.
Assumption 2. For every i, j ∈ I, there holds Ci ∼ Cj .
Assumption 3. The influence network G[W ] is strongly con-
nected, W is row-stochastic, and wii > 0,∀i ∈ I.
Assumption 2 implies that, for every i, j ∈ I, the graphs
G[Ci] and G[Cj ] have the same structure (but possible with
different edge weights, including weights of opposing signs).
This means that all individuals have the same view on which
topics have dependent relationships with which other topics,
but the assigned weights cij (and signs) may be different. This
assumption ensures that the scope of this paper is reasonable,
because otherwise the assumption that Ci ∼ Cj does not hold
would introduce too many different scenarios to analyse.
2By semi-simple, we mean that the geometric and algebraic multiplicities
are the same. Equivalently, all Jordan blocks of the eigenvalue 1 are 1 by 1.
Objective 1. Let a set of logic matrices Ci, i ∈ I and an
influence network G[W ] be given, satisfying Assumptions 1, 2
and 3. Suppose that each individual i’s opinion vector xi(t) ∈
[−1, 1]m evolves according to Eq. (1). Then, for each k ∈ J
and generic initial conditions x(0) ∈ [−1, 1]nm, this paper
will investigate a method to systematically determine when
there exists, and when there does not exist, an αk ∈ [−1, 1]
such that
lim
t→∞x
k
i (t) = αk, ∀i ∈ I. (4)
We will show that Ci of a certain structure always guar-
antees consensus, and conversely, that Ci of a certain other
structure will lead to disagreement in certain identifiable
topics.
Next, we provide further discussion to motivate Objective 1,
including our interest in heterogeneous Ci. The dynamics of
the form Eq. (1) is a variation on the model studied in [20],
[21], and we explain our interest in this particular variation by
explaining in detail the differences between Eq. (1) and work
in [20], [21].
For convenience, denote the vector of opinions for the entire
influence network as x = [x1(t)>, . . . ,xn(t)>]> ∈ Rnm.
Supposing that the logic matrices were indeed homogeneous,
i.e. Ci = Cj = C for all i, j ∈ I, we can verify that much
of the analysis becomes rather easy. For then one could write
the influence network dynamics as
x(t+ 1) = (W ⊗C)x(t), (5)
and limiting behaviour is characterised by the following result.
Theorem 1 ([20, Theorem 3]). The system Eq. (5) con-
verges if and only if limk→∞Ck , C∞ exist, and either
C∞ = 0m×m or limk→∞W k = W∞ exists3. Moreover,
the system converges to limt→∞ x(t) = (W∞ ⊗C∞)x(0) if
limk→∞W k = W∞ exists, otherwise limt→∞ x(t) = 0mn.
For completeness and to aid discussion, we also record the
Friedkin–Johnsen variant to Eq. (1), which is given as
xi(t+ 1) = λi
n∑
j=1
wijCixj(t) + (1− λi)xi(0). (6)
Here, the parameter λi ∈ [0, 1] represents individual i’s
susceptibility to interpersonal influence, while 1−λi represents
the level of stubborn attachment by individual i to his/her
initial opinion xi(0). This paper studies the special case where
there are no stubborn individuals, i.e. λi = 1 for all i ∈ I,
and thus Eq. (6) is equivalent to Eq. (1). The paper [20]
mainly focuses on the considerable challenge of obtaining
complete convergence results for the model in Eq. (6) but
with a homogeneous C, and aside from some short remarks,
does not investigate the effect of C on the final opinion
distribution (assuming the opinions do in fact converge to a
steady state). The paper [21] secures a convergence result for
heterogeneous Ci but makes an assumption that there is at
least one somewhat stubborn individual. Unlike [20] and [21],
the key focus of this paper is to investigate the effect of the
3It is clear that if we have homogeneousC, then Assumption 1 is consistent
with the requirement on C in Theorem 1.
5structure of Ci, including heterogeneity, on the final opinion
distribution.
We explain this further. If λi < 1 and Ci = Im for all
i ∈ I, then existing results establish that under Assumption 3,
a strong diversity of opinions emerges [20], with obviously
no effects arising from the Ci matrix. On the other hand,
consider the case of homogeneous logic matrices and no
stubbornness. For any W satisfying Assumption 3, it is known
that limk→∞W k = 1nγ> where γ> is a left eigenvector of
W associated with the simple eigenvalue at 1, having entries
γj > 0, and normalised to satisfy γ>1n = 1 [28]. Combining
with Theorem 1, we can conclude that under Assumption 3
and if Ci = Cj = C and λi = 1 for all i, j ∈ I, the opinions
of all individuals on any given topic reach a consensus. That is,
for all i ∈ I, there holds limt→∞ xi(t) =
∑n
j=1 γjC
txj(0).
In contrast, this paper assumes heterogeneous Ci and no
stubbornness among individuals. If we can show that opinions
on a given topic fail to reach a consensus in the general case
of Ci 6= Im, and instead strong diversity emerges, then this
failure must be attributed to the structure, and the hetero-
geneity, of the Ci among individuals. This would constitute a
novel insight into the emergence of strong diversity in strongly
connected networks, linking it for the first time to differences
in individuals’ belief systems as opposed to stubbornness [15],
a desire to be unique [25], [26], or social distancing [25].
To conclude this subsection, we now provide the definition
of “competing logical interdependencies” which will be impor-
tant in some scenarios for characterising the final opinions.
Definition 1 (Competing Logical Interdependence). An influ-
ence network is said to contain individuals with competing
logical interdependencies on topic p ∈ J if there exist
individuals i, j such that for some q ∈ J \ {p}, Ci and Cj
have nonzero entries cpq,i and cpq,j that are of opposite signs.
In other words, individuals with competing logical interde-
pendencies are those who, when having the same opinion on
topic q, move in opposite directions on the opinion spectrum
for topic p. Such occurrences can be prevalent in society. Using
the example in Section II-B, one might have an individual j
with
Cj =
[
1 0
−0.5 0.5
]
. (7)
because j considers that private companies are profit-driven,
and therefore cannot be ethically trusted with the exploration
of Space. Then, from Eq. (3), one has that xj(∞) = [1,−1]>,
i.e. individual j eventually firmly believes Space exploration
should not be privatised. In particular, x1j (∞) = −x2j (∞).
In light of Assumption 2, if two individuals have competing
interdependencies on topic p, then for every individual i ∈ I,
there is necessarily some individual k ∈ I \ {i} with whom
individual i has competing logical interdependence on topic
p: the nonzero entries cpq,i and cpq,k are of opposite signs for
some q ∈ J .
Remark 1. Recall that Ci is individual i’s set of con-
straints/functional dependencies between topics in i’s belief
system. Thus, heterogeneity of Ci may arise for many different
reasons, such as education, background, or expertise in the
topic. For example, if the set of topics is related to sports,
a professional athlete may have very different weights in
Ci compared to someone that does not pursue an active
lifestyle. Competing interdependencies may also arise for
contentious issues, such as gun control discussions in the USA.
Interestingly, [30] showed that when presented with the same
published statement on an issue, different people could take
opposite positions on the issue.
In the next section, we provide the set of main theoretical
results of this paper to address Objective 1.
III. MAIN RESULTS
The main results are presented in two parts. First, we es-
tablish a general convergence result for the networked system.
Then, we analyse the limiting opinion distribution and the role
of the set of logic matrices in determining whether opinions
for a given topic reach consensus or fail to do so. In order to
place the focus on the theoretical results and interpretations as
social phenomena, all proofs are presented to the Appendix.
A. Convergence
The network dynamics of Eq. (1) are given by
x(t+ 1) =
w11C1 · · · w1nC1... . . . ...
wn1Cn · · · wnnCn
x(t), (8)
and we define the system matrix above as B. To begin,
we rewrite the network dynamics Eq. (8) into a differ-
ent form to aid analysis by introducing a coordinate trans-
form (actually a reordering). In particular, define yk(t) =
[y1k(t), . . . y
n
k (t)]
> = [xk1(t), . . . , x
k
n(t)]
>, for k ∈ J as
the vector of all n individuals’ opinions on the kth topic.
Then, y(t) = [y1(t)
>, . . . ,ym(t)
>]> captures all of the n
individuals’ opinions on the m topics. One obtains that
yk(t+ 1) =
m∑
j=1
diag(ckj)Wyj(t), (9)
where diag(ckj) ∈ Rn is a diagonal matrix with the ith
diagonal element of diag(ckj) being ckj,i, the (k, j)th entry
of Ci. It follows that
y(t+ 1) =
 diag(c11)W · · · diag(c1m)W... . . . ...
diag(cm1)W · · · diag(cmm)W
y(t). (10)
We denote the matrix in Eq. (10) as A, with block matrix
elements Apq = diag(cpq)W . We now show how the system
Eq. (10) can be considered as a consensus process on a
multiplex (or multi-layered) signed graph.
Consider the matrixA in Eq. (10), with the associated graph
G[A], and the matrix B in Eq. (8), with associated graph
G[B]. Clearly, the two graphs are the same up to a reordering
of the nodes. In G[A], with node set V[A] = {v1, . . . , vnm},
one can consider the node subset Vp = {v(p−1)n+1, . . . , vpn},
p ∈ J as a layer of the multi-layer graph G[A] with vertices
associated with the opinions of individuals 1, . . . , n on topic
6x11
x21
x31
x12
x22
x32
wij y
1
1
y12
y13
y21
y22
y23
wij
G[B] G[A]
⇔
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Figure 1. An illustrative network with 2 individuals discussing 3 topics, with
only selected edges drawn for clarity. Each node represents the opinion of
an individual for a topic, with red and blue nodes associated with individuals
1 and 2, respectively. The black edges represent interpersonal influence via
the weight wij , while the coloured edges represent logical interdependencies
between topics. In G[B], nodes are grouped and ordered by individual in
node subset V˜q (as illustrated by the dotted green ellipse groupings) leading
to Eq. (8). In G[A], the nodes are grouped and ordered by topic in node
subset Vp (as illustrated by the dotted green ellipses) leading to Eq. (10).
p. In G[B], with node set V[B] = {v1, . . . , vnm}, one can
consider the node subset V˜q = {v(q−1)m+1, . . . , vqm}, q ∈ I
as a layer of a multi-layer graph with vertices associated
with the opinions of individual q on topics 1, . . . ,m. This is
illustrated in Fig. 1, where each layer is identified by a dotted
green ellipse border. A key motivation to study G[A] and
the dynamical system Eq. (10) is that all the block diagonal
entries Aii of A are nonnegative and irreducible because
Assumption 1 indicates that diag(cpp) has positive diagonal
entries. This means that the edges between nodes in the subset
Vp = {v(p−1)n+1, . . . , vpn}, p ∈ J have positive weights,
and this property greatly aids in the checking of the structural
balance or unbalance of the network G[A] given G[W ] and
Ci,∀ i ∈ I.
Verify from the row-stochastic property of W and the row-
sum property of Ci in Assumption 1 that the entries of A
satisfy
∑nm
q=1 |apq| = 1 for all p = 1, . . . , nm. We therefore
conclude that Eq. (10) has the same dynamics as the discrete-
time Altafini model (see e.g. [10], [11]).
Remark 2. Although Eq. (10) has the same dynamics as the
discrete-time Altafini model, a number of important differences
exist. First, the context of negative edge weights is entirely
different: in the Altafini model, wij < 0 implies individual
i mistrusts individual j [10]. In contrast, Eq. (10) assumes
nonnegative influence wij ≥ 0, and the negative edge weights
arise from negative logical interdependencies in Ci. Moreover
the network structure of G[A] is affected by both the influence
network G[W ] and the logic matrix graphs G[Ci].
The main convergence result is given as follows.
Theorem 2. Suppose that for a population of n individuals,
the vector of the n individuals’ opinions y(t) evolves ac-
cording to Eq. (10), with interpersonal influences captured by
G[W ]. Suppose further that Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold.
Then, for any initial condition y(0) ∈ Rnm, there exists
some y∗ ∈ Rnm such that there holds limt→∞ y(t) = y∗
exponentially fast. If yik(0) ∈ [−1, 1] for all i ∈ I and k ∈ J ,
then yik(t) ∈ [−1, 1] for all t ≥ 0 and i ∈ I and k ∈ J .
Having established that the opinion dynamical system al-
ways converges, we now address Objective 1 by studying the
influence of Ci in determining the limiting opinion vector y∗.
B. Consensus and Disagreement of Each Topic
We now explain how to use the logic matrices Ci to
systematically determine whether opinions on a given topic
p ∈ J will reach a consensus or not. We defer discussion
of the social interpretation of the theoretical results until
Section III-C, and illustrate some of the conclusions drawn
in this section with selected simulations in Section IV.
Consider the graph G[Ci] associated with Ci for some
i ∈ I, which is a signed graph if there are negative off-
diagonal entries in Ci. It turns out (see Theorem 3 imme-
diately below) that if Ci for all i ∈ I are irreducible, then all
topics will reach a consensus (although the consensus value
for two different topics p and q may be different). We remark
that irreducible logic matrices correspond to G[Ci] which are
strongly connected, and thus for any two topics p, q ∈ J ,
there is a (possibly signed) directed path from p to q. In other
words, all topics are directly or indirectly dependent on all
other topics.
Theorem 3. Let the hypotheses in Theorem 2 hold. Suppose
that (i) yik(0) ∈ [−1, 1] for all i ∈ I and k ∈ J , and (ii) that
Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Suppose further that Ci,∀ i ∈ I
are irreducible4. Then, for all k ∈ J , limt→∞ yk(t) = αk1n
exponentially fast, where αk ∈ [−1, 1]. Moreover,
1) If there are no competing logical interdependencies, as
given in Definition 1, and G[Ci],∀ i ∈ I are structurally
balanced5, then for almost all initial conditions, |αp| =
|αq| 6= 0,∀ p, q ∈ J .
2) If there are no competing logical interdependencies, and
G[Ci],∀ i ∈ I are structurally unbalanced, then αk =
0,∀ k ∈ J .
3) If there are competing logical interdependencies, then
αk = 0,∀ k ∈ J .
Further to the conclusions of Theorem 3, one can obtain
the following result for the case where consensus to a nonzero
opinion value is achieved.
Corollary 1. Let the hypotheses in Theorem 3 hold. Suppose
that there are no competing logical interdependencies, and
G[Ci],∀ i ∈ I are structurally balanced. For G[Ci] with node
set V = {v1, . . . , vm}, define two disjoint subsets of nodes
V[Ci]+ and V[Ci]− so that each edge between two nodes in
V[Ci]+ or two nodes in V[Ci]− has a positive weight, and
each edge between two nodes in V[Ci]+ and V[Ci]− has a
negative weight. Then, for any p, q ∈ J , there holds
1) αp = αq if vq, vp ∈ V[Ci]+ or vq, vp ∈ V[Ci]−.
2) αp = −αq if vq ∈ V[Ci]+ and vp ∈ V[Ci]−.
Consider now the more general case where Ci for all i ∈ I
are reducible. Thus, G[Ci] is no longer strongly connected.
4Under Assumption 2, irreducibility of one Ci implies the same for all.
5Under Assumption 2 and in the absence of competing logical interdepen-
dencies, the presence or absence of structural balance for one Ci implies the
same for all.
7The logic matrices of all individuals can be expressed in a
lower block triangular form through an inessential reordering
of the topic set. From Assumption 2, we further conclude that
there exists a common permutation matrix P such that, for
all i ∈ I, P TCiP is lower block triangular. Without loss
of generality, we therefore assume that the topics p ∈ J are
ordered such that, for each i ∈ I,
Ci =

C11,i 0 · · · 0
C21,i C22,i · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
Cs1,i Cs2,i · · · Css,i
 , (11)
where Cjj,i ∈ Rsj×sj is irreducible for any j ∈ S ,
{1, 2, · · · , s} and sj are positive integers such that
∑s
j=1 sj =
m. Decompose the opinion set J into s disjoint subsets Jj
for j ∈ S where
Jj , {
j∑
i=1
si−1 + 1,
j∑
i=1
si−1 + 2, . . . ,
j∑
i=1
si−1 + sj}, (12)
with s0 = 0. Though reducible Ci may seem to be restrictive,
they are in fact common given the problem context since
they imply a cascade logical interdependence structure among
the topics. This may be representative of an individual i
who obtains Ci by sequentially building upon an axiom or
axioms (the first Cjj,i block matrices). The two topics of the
Space exploration example given in Eq. (2) constitute one such
example of a belief system driven by an axiom (Topic 1).
From the perspective of the graph G[Ci], the expression in
Eq. (11) enables G[Ci] to be divided into strongly connected
components which are “closed” or “open”. (This is related
to a concept called the condensation of a graph, see [28]).
Formally, we say that a subgraph G¯ is a strongly connected
component of G if G¯ is strongly connected and any other
subgraph of G strictly containing G¯ is not strongly connected.
A strongly connected component G¯ of a graph G is said to be
closed if there are no incoming edges to G¯ from a node outside
of G¯, and is said to be open otherwise. The simplest possible
strongly connected component is a single node, and it would
be closed if there were no incoming edges to it. Figure 2 shows
an example of a graph G[Ci] divided into strongly connected
components (identified by the dotted line encircling a set of
nodes), with the blue and purple components being closed,
and the green and orange components being open. Following
the notation in Eq. (11) and Eq. (12), we have for the example
in Fig. 2, s = 4, s1 = 3, s2 = 1, s3 = 2, s4 = 1, and
J1 = {1, 2, 3}, J2 = {4}, J3 = {5, 6}, J4 = {7}.
If the topic set Jj corresponds to a closed strongly
connected component of G[Ci], then clearly in Eq. (11),
Cpj,i = 0 for all p 6= j. One can then use Theorem 3 and
Corollary 1 to establish that for every k ∈ Jj , there holds
limt→∞ yk(t) = αk1n exponentially fast, with αk ∈ [−1, 1].
That is, all opinions in topic k ∈ Jj reach a consensus.
If, on the other hand, the topic set Jj corresponds to an
open strongly connected component of G[Ci], then the results
presented below can be employed sequentially in order to
establish whether opinions on a given topic have reached
a consensus. By “sequentially”, we mean that we analyse
G[Ci]
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Figure 2. An illustrative example of G[Ci], with each node representing a
topic, and edges representing logical interdependencies between topics (self-
loops are hidden for clarity). One can divide the nodes into strongly connected
components (each dotted coloured circle denotes a strongly connected com-
ponent). The results of this paper allow one to progressively analyse each
component to establish which topics will have opinions reaching a consensus
and which topics will have opinions reaching a persistent disagreement.
the topic sets Jj with j in the order 1, 2, . . . , s. Under
Assumption 2, define for each topic p ∈ J , the set
Jˆp , {q ∈ J : cpq,i 6= 0, q 6= p} (13)
where cpq,i is the pqth entry of Ci. In other words, Jˆp
identifies all topics q ∈ J that topic p is logically dependent
upon. Because of Assumption 2, the set Jˆp is the same for all
individuals i ∈ I. In Fig. 2, Jˆ6 for example is {4, 5}.
We present necessary and sufficient conditions that ensure
every topic in the subset Jj reaches a consensus of opinions
in two theorems, the first for the case when the subset Jj is a
singleton (e.g. J4 = {7} in Fig. 2), and the second for when
Jj has at least two elements (e.g. J3 = {5, 6} in Fig. 2).
Theorem 4. Let the hypotheses in Theorem 2 hold. Assume
that (i) yik(0) ∈ [−1, 1] for all i ∈ I and k ∈ J , and (ii)
that Ci,∀ i ∈ I is decomposed as in Eq. (11). Suppose that
Jj = {p}, as defined in Eq. (12), is a singleton, and let Jˆp
as defined in Eq. (13) be nonempty. Suppose further that all
topics q ∈ Jˆp satisfy limt→∞ yq = αq1n, αq ∈ [−1, 1]. Then,
limt→∞ yp(t) = αp1n for some αp ∈ R if and only if there
exists a κ ∈ [−1, 1] such that
κ =
∑
q∈Jˆp αqcpq,i∑
q∈Jˆp |cpq,i|
, ∀ i ∈ I. (14)
If such a κ exists, then αp = κ.
The key necessary and sufficient condition involves
Eq. (14), which is somewhat complex and nonintuitive. We
now provide a corollary which studies the condition in Eq. (14)
for some situations which are important or of interest in the
social context. Discussion and interpretation of these formal
results are provided in the following Section III-C.
Corollary 2. Adopting the hypotheses in Theorem 4, the
following hold:
1) Suppose that Jˆp = {q} is a singleton. Then, there exists
a κ ∈ [−1, 1] satisfying Eq. (14) if and only if there
8do not exist individuals i, j ∈ I with competing logical
interdependencies on topic p (as defined in Definition 1).
2) If αq = 0 for all q ∈ Jˆp, then κ = 0 satisfies Eq. (14).
3) Suppose that Jˆp = {q1, . . . , qr}, r ≥ 2. If cpqk,i =
cpqk,j = cpqk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , r} and i, j ∈ I, then
there exists a κ ∈ [−1, 1] satisfying Eq. (14).
4) Suppose that Jˆp = {q1, . . . , qr}, r ≥ 2. Suppose further
that |αqu | = |αqv | for all u, v ∈ {1, . . . , r}. Then, there
exists a κ ∈ [−1, 1] satisfying Eq. (14) if either (i) the
sign of cpqk,i and αqk are equal for all i ∈ I and k ∈
{1, . . . , r} or (ii) the sign of cpqk,i and αqk are opposite
for all i ∈ I and k ∈ {1, . . . , r}. In the case of (i),
κ = |αqk |, and in the case of (ii), κ = −|αqk |.
When Jj is not a singleton, the analysis becomes signif-
icantly more involved. To that end, we first introduce some
additional notation. Define
J˜j , ∪k∈Jj Jˆk \ Jj (15)
as the set of topics not in Jj that the topics in Jj depend upon.
For example, in Fig. 2, J3 = {5, 6}, Jˆ5 = {3, 6}, Jˆ6 = {4, 5},
and J˜3 = {3, 4}. Note that if Jj = {p} is a singleton, we
have J˜j = Jˆp. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Theorem 4 requires
that consensus must first occur for topics in J˜j = Jˆp, on
which the topics in Jj depend. The following theorem also
has the requirement that consensus occur for all topics in J˜j .
Theorem 5. Let the hypotheses in Theorem 2 hold. Assume
that (i) yik(0) ∈ [−1, 1] for all i ∈ I and k ∈ J , and that
(ii) Ci,∀ i ∈ I is decomposed as in Eq. (11). Suppose that
Jj , as defined in Eq. (12), has at least two elements. Let J˜j ,
as defined in Eq. (15), be nonempty and suppose further that
all topics q ∈ J˜j satisfy y∗q = αq1n, αq ∈ [−1, 1]. Then,
limt→∞ yk = αk1n for all k ∈ Jj if and only if, for every
k ∈ Jj , there exists a φk ∈ [−1, 1] such that
φk
 ∑
r∈Jj\{k}
|ckr,i|+
∑
q∈J˜j
|ckq,i|

=
∑
r∈Jj\{k}
φrckr,i +
∑
q∈J˜j
αqckq,i, ∀i ∈ I (16)
If such a set of φk exist, then αk = φk for all k ∈ Jj .
Similar to above, we now present a corollary which gives
sufficient conditions for Eq. (16) in two scenarios.
Corollary 3. Adopting the hypotheses in Theorem 5, the
following hold:
1) If αq = 0 for all q ∈ J˜j , then φk = 0∀k ∈ Jj satisfies
Eq. (16).
2) If ckp,i = ckp,h for all k ∈ Jj , p ∈ J and i, h ∈ I, then
there exist φk ∈ [−1, 1] satisfying Eq. (16) ∀k ∈ Jj .
For the illustrative example in Fig. 2, one would first analyse
the blue and purple components using Theorem 3. Then, one
would analyse the green component using Theorem 5, and last
the orange component using Theorem 4.
C. Discussion and Social Interpretations
We conclude this section by providing some discussion
and comments on the main results, focusing in particular
on the theorems and corollaries in Section III-B. Overall,
the outcomes we have established depend on the graphical
structures G[Ci] on the one hand, and on the numerical
values (including their signs) of the Ci entries on the other.
This dependence sometimes flows simply from the signs (the
presence or absence of competing logical interdependencies),
and sometimes from the precise values of the Ci. Further,
when consensus on a topic occurs, it is evident that sometimes
a value 0 is always the outcome, and sometimes a nonzero
value dependent on the initial opinions of those topics in the
closed and strongly connected components of G[Ci].
It is clear from Theorem 3 that for any topic set Jj
corresponding to a closed and strongly connected component
of G[Ci], every topic k ∈ Jj will reach a consensus. One
interpretation is that a closed and strongly connected com-
ponent corresponds to Jj having a topic(s) that is an axiom
(or axioms) upon which an individual builds his or her belief
system (see below Eq. (12)). Our results show that discussion
of axiomatic topics will always lead a consensus under the
model Eq. (1) (a consensus might not be reached if, as in
Eq. (6), there is stubbornness present).
Theorem 3 and Corollaries 2 and 3 also illustrate that
competing logical interdependencies, if present, can play a
major role in determining the final opinion values. For in-
stance, see Theorem 3 Part 3, where given a topic set Jj
corresponding to a closed and strongly connected component
of G[Ci], all opinion values for all topics in Jj converge to
the neutral value at 0 whenever competing interdependencies
are present in the topics in Jj . Also, the presence of any
competing logical interdependencies in topic p ∈ Jj is enough
to prevent the sufficient conditions detailed in Corollary 2 Item
1), 3), and 4) and Corollary 3 Item 2) from being satisfied. Of
particular note is Corollary 2 Item 1). When Jˆp = {q} is a
singleton, heterogeneity in the entries of cpq,i is not enough to
prevent a consensus of opinions on topic p; competing logical
interdependences are required. This last finding is a surprising,
and non-intuitive result.
The sufficient condition in Corollary 2 Item 2) requires
αq = 0 for all q ∈ Jˆp. This is not as restrictive as it first seems:
one possible scenario is that all elements of Jˆp belong to topics
from the same closed and strongly connected component in
G[Ci], with the component being structurally unbalanced,
or having competing logical interdependencies. The same
can be said for Corollary 3 Item 1). Part of the sufficient
condition for Corollary 2 Item 4) is that |αqu | = |αqv | for
all qu, qv ∈ Jˆp = {q1, . . . , qr}, r ≥ 2. This will always hold
if q1, . . . , qr are topics that are part of the same closed and
strongly connected component in G[Ci].
From numerous simulations, we frequently observed that
minor heterogenieties in the entries of cpq,i, p ∈ Jj among
the individuals (e.g. if the cpq,i were all selected from a uni-
form distribution) were often sufficient to create disagreement
among the opinions on topic p ∈ Jj . We observed this in many
different examples, except in the case of Corollary 2 Item 1),
9where Jj = {p} and Jˆp = {q} are both singletons, since
existence of competing logical interdependencies was proven
to be a necessary and sufficient condition for disagreement.
It is also clear from Theorems 3, 4 and 5 that disagreement
is possible only in topic sets Jj associated with an open
strongly connected component of G[Ci]. Put another way,
belief systems with a cascade logical structure, viz. reducible
Ci in the form of Eq. (11), including heterogeneity among
individuals’ belief systems, play a significant role in gen-
erating disagreement when social networks discuss multiple
logically interdependent topics. Looking at Eq. (1), one can
see two separate processes occurring: the DeGroot component
describes interpersonal influence between individuals in an
effort to reach a consensus, while the logic matrix by itself
(as in Eq. (3)) captures an intrapersonal effort to secure
logical consistency of opinions across several topics. These
two drivers may or may not end up in conflict, and the presence
of conflict or lack thereof determines whether opinions of a
certain topic reach a consensus or fail to do so. Our results in
Theorems 4 and 5 identify when such conflict can occur.
Remark 3. Theorems 4 and 5 establish necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for topic pk ∈ Jj = {p1, . . . , psj} to reach
a consensus under a particular hypothesis. Specifically, it is
assumed that for the set Jj under consideration, there holds
y∗q = αq1n , ∀ q ∈ J˜j . (17)
That is, all other topics that one or more topics pk ∈ Jj de-
pend upon are assumed to have reached a consensus. Based on
numerous simulations, we believe the requirement that Eq. (17)
holds is also a necessary condition for ypk , pk ∈ Jj to reach
a consensus. In other words, if any topic q ∈ J˜j fails to reach
a consensus, we conjecture that all ypk , k = 1, . . . , sj will
also fail to reach a consensus. Confirming this would provide
yet another indication that networks with belief systems having
a cascade logic structure more readily result in disagreement.
We leave this to future investigations.
IV. SIMULATIONS
We now provide simulations to illustrate some of the results
in Section III using a network G[W ] of n = 6 individuals, with
W =

0.2 0 0 0 0.8 0
0.5 0.3 0 0 0 0.2
0 0.3 0.1 0 0 0.6
0 0 0.85 0.15 0 0
0 0 0 0.2 0.8 0
0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5
 . (18)
Note that W satisfies Assumption 3. Initial conditions are
generated by selecting each xpi (0) from a uniform distribution
in [−1, 1], and the same initial conditon vector x(0) is used
for all simulations. We consider 5 topics, i.e. J = {1, . . . , 5}.
In the first simulation, we use two logic matrices:
Ĉ =

1 0 0 0 0
−0.5 0.5 0 0 0
−0.3 −0.6 0.1 0 0
0 −0.3 0 0.2 −0.5
0 −0.5 0 −0.2 0.3
 (19a)
C¯ =

1 0 0 0 0
−0.8 0.2 0 0 0
−0.3 −0.1 0.6 0 0
0 −0.3 0 0.2 −0.5
0 −0.5 0 −0.2 0.3
 . (19b)
The individuals have logic matrix Ci = Ĉ for i = 1, 2, 3
and Ci = C¯ for i = 4, 5, 6. Notice that there are no
competing logical interdependencies associated with the set of
Ci. Moreover, according to Eq. (12), we have J1 = {1},J2 =
{2},J3 = {3},J4 = {4, 5}. The temporal evolution of x(t)
is given in Fig. 3, where solid or dotted lines correspond
to an individual with Ci = Ĉ or Ci = C¯, respectively.
We see that Topic 1 (Theorem 3) and Topic 2 (Corollary 2,
Statement 1)) reach a consensus. In particular, notice that
the entries of Ĉ and C¯ are such that ĉ21 6= c¯21 but Topic
2 still reaches a consensus because there are no competing
logical interdependencies in Topic 2. In contrast, Topic 3 fails
to reach a consensus (Theorem 4) despite both Topics 1 and
2 reaching a consensus. Strong diversity emerges because the
heterogeneities in the third row of Ĉ and C¯ are such that
there does not exist a κ ∈ [−1, 1] that satisfies Eq. (14), even
though the sign patterns in the third row are the same between
Ĉ and C¯. Topics 4 and 5, forming J4, both reach a consensus
because the fourth and fifth rows of Ĉ and C¯ are the same
(Corollary 3, Statement 2)).
Replacing Ĉ with
C˜ =

1 0 0 0 0
0.5 0.5 0 0 0
−0.3 −0.1 0.6 0 0
0 −0.3 0 0.2 −0.5
0 −0.5 0 −0.2 0.3
 (20)
for individuals 1, 2, 3, we run the same simulation (i.e. with
the same G[W ] and initial conditions x(0)). The results are
displayed in Fig. 4. Notice that the only difference between
Ĉ and C˜ is a sign reversal in the c21 entry. Now, there are
competing logical interdependencies in Topic 2, which results
in a failure to reach consensus on this topic (Corollary 2,
Statement 1)). Because of the cascade logic structure, Topics
3, 4 and 5 also fail to reach a consensus (illustrating our
conjecture in Remark 3). This is despite no other differences
when comparing Ĉ and C˜, and Topics 4 and 5 reaching a
consensus in the previous simulation when individuals 1, 2, 3
used Ĉ. Moreover, a strong diversity of opinions emerge for
Topics 2, 3, 4 and 5.
V. CONCLUSION
We have studied influence networks in which individuals
discuss a set of logically interdependent topics, assuming
that the network has no stubborn individuals in order to
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Figure 3. Temporal evolution of opinions for 5 topics coupled with Ci given
in Eq. (19). The solid and dotted lines correspond to individuals withCi = Cˆ
and Ci = C¯, respectively.
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Figure 4. Temporal evolution of opinions for 5 topics coupled with Ĉ
replaced by C˜ given in Eq. (20). The solid and dotted lines correspond to
individuals with Ci = C˜ and Ci = C¯, respectively.
focus on the effects of the logical interdependence structure.
We established that for strongly connected networks, and
reasonable assumptions on the logic matrix, the opinions
converge exponentially fast to some steady-state value. We
then provided a systematic way to help determine whether a
given topic will reach a consensus or fail to do so. It was dis-
covered that heterogeneity of reducible logic matrices among
individuals, including differences in signs of the off-diagonal
entries, played a primary role in producing disagreement in
the final opinion values. In the problem context, we have
established that a cascade logic structure and heterogeneity of
individuals’ belief systems, including existence of competing
logical interdependencies, generates the phenomenon of strong
diversity of final opinions. We believe this to be a key new
insight and explanation of strong diversity, since most existing
works attribute strong diversity in connected networks to
factors such as individual stubbornness. Future work will focus
on proving the conjecture in Remark 3, relaxing Assumption 2,
and the effect of the logic matrix on the convergence rate.
APPENDIX
To begin, we detail a result to be used in the sequel.
Lemma 2. Let A ∈ Rn×n be a given irreducible row-
substochastic matrix. Then, ρ(A) < 1.
Proof. This lemma is an immediate consequence of [31,
Lemma 2.8].
In order to prove Theorem 2, we first establish the following
lemma.
Lemma 3. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. Then, G[A],
where A is the matrix in Eq. (10), is strongly connected and
aperiodic if and only if, separately, G[W ] and G[Ci],∀ i are
strongly connected and aperiodic.
Proof. Let C¯ be a nonnegative row-stochastic matrix with the
same zero and non-zero pattern of entries as Ci,∀ i ∈ I,
i.e. C¯ ∼ Ci,∀ i ∈ I. Then, by the lemma hypothesis on
Assumption 2, the graph G[C¯ ⊗W ] has the same vertex and
edge set as G[A], but with different edge weights (including
the fact that all edge weights of G[C¯ ⊗ W ] are positive,
whereas negative edge weights may exist in G[A]). Thus, if we
can prove that G[C¯⊗W ] is strongly connected and aperiodic
(as we shall do now) it will follow that G[A] is also strongly
connected and aperiodic.
Suppose that W ≥ 0 and C¯ are primitive, and specifically
that W k1 > 0 and C¯k2 > 0 for some k1, k2 ∈ N. Then, for
all max{k1, k2} < j ∈ N, there holds W j > 0 and C¯j >
0 (see below Lemma 1). Next, observe from Lemma 1 that
G[C¯ ⊗W ] is strongly connected and aperiodic if and only
if C¯ ⊗W is primitive, i.e. ∃k ∈ N : (C¯ ⊗W )k > 0. It is
straightforward to conclude that C¯k ⊗W k > 0 if and only
if W k > 0 and C¯k > 0, since otherwise there is a zero
element in C¯k ⊗W k. By choosing k > max{k1, k2}, it is
straightforward to conclude that one requires G[W ] and G[C¯],
separately, to be strongly connected and aperiodic in order for
G[A] to be strongly connected and aperiodic.
A. Theorem 2
The proof is has two parts: in Part 1 and Part 2, we prove
convergence for irreducible and reducible Ci, respectively.
Part 1: Consider the case where all the Ci are irreducible
(i.e. G[Ci] is strongly connected). We have that G[W ] and
G[Ci],∀i ∈ I are separately strongly connected and aperiodic
from Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 (the aperiodicity is a conse-
quence of the assumption that wii > 0 and cpp,i > 0 for all
i ∈ I and p ∈ J ). From Lemma 1, we then conclude that G[A]
is strongly connected and aperiodic. Moreover, every diagonal
entry of A is strictly positive. Using existing results on the
Altafini model for strongly connected networks [11, Theorem
1 and 2], we conclude that limt→∞ y(t) = y∗ exponentially
fast, where y∗ ∈ Rnm is the steady-state opinion distribution.
Part 2: Consider now the case where all Ci are reducible,
with Ci having the form in Eq. (11), S , {1, 2, . . . s}, and
11
sj being integers satisfying
∑s
j=1 sj = m. The matrix A in
Eq. (10) has the following form
A =

A¯11 0 · · · 0
A¯21 A¯22 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
A¯s1 A¯s2 · · · A¯ss
 (21)
with block matrix elements A¯pq, p, q ∈ S given
A¯pq=

Agh Ag,h+1 · · · Ag,h+sq−1
Ag+1,h Ag+1,h+1 · · · Ag+1,h+sq−1
...
...
. . .
...
Ag+sp−1,h Ag+sp−1,h+1 · · · Ag+sp−1,h+sq−1.

(22)
Here, g =
∑p
i=1 si−1 + 1 and h =
∑q
i=1 si−1 + 1 for
p, q ∈ S with s0 = 0. From the decomposition in Eq. (11),
we know that Cpp,i is irreducible for any p ∈ S and i ∈ I,
which implies that G[Cpp,i] is strongly connected. Moreover,
G[Cpp,i] is apediodic since all the diagonals are positive (see
Assumption 1).
We prove the exponential convergence property by induc-
tion. First, for the base case consider the topics in J1, which
are {1, 2, . . . , s1}. Since C11,i is irreducible for all i ∈ I,
we obtain from Part 1 that for all topics k ∈ J1, there holds
limt→∞ yk(t) = y
∗
k exponentially fast, for some y
∗
k ∈ Rn.
We now prove the induction step for topic k in the topic
subset Jp, with p ∈ S and p ≥ 2. Suppose that for all topics
l ∈ ∪p−1j=1Jj , limt→∞ yl(t) = y∗l exponentially fast, where
y∗l is the vector of final opinions. We need to show that for
all topics k in Jp, there exists a vector y∗k ∈ Rn such that
there holds limt→∞ yk(t) = y
∗
k exponentially fast. Look at
the p-th block row of matrix A. Suppose first that A¯pq = 0
for q < p. Since Cpp,i is irreducible for any i ∈ I, then by
the analysis in Part 1 of this proof, we conclude that for every
k ∈ Jp, there exists a y∗k ∈ Rn such that limt→∞ yk(t) = y∗k
exponentially fast. Next, suppose to the contrary, that there
exists a q < p such that A¯pq 6= 0. Because G[Cpp,i],∀i ∈ I
are strongly connected and aperiodic, one can apply Lemma 3
to obtain that G[A¯pp] is strongly connected and aperiodic, i.e.
A¯pp is irreducible. Let |A¯pp| be the matrix whose ijth entry
is the absolute value of the ijth entry of A¯pp. Since A¯pp is
irreducible, then |A¯pp| is also irreducible. Because there exists
q < p such that A¯pq 6= 0, we conclude that |A¯pp| is row-
substochastic. It follows from Lemma 2 that ρ(|A¯pp|) < 1.
Using the triangle inequality, verify that the ijth entry of |A¯kpp|
is less than or equal to the ijth entry of |A¯pp|k. Thus
‖A¯kpp‖∞ = ‖|A¯kpp|‖∞ ≤ ‖|A¯pp|k‖∞.
It follows that
lim
k→∞
‖A¯kpp‖1/k∞ ≤ lim
k→∞
‖|A¯pp|k‖1/k∞ ,
which in turn implies that ρ(A¯pp) ≤ ρ(|A¯pp|) < 1. Recall
that at the start of the induction step, we assumed that for all
l ∈ ∪p−1j=1Jj (with p ∈ S and p ≥ 2), there exists y∗l ∈ Rn
such that limt→∞ yl(t) = y
∗
l exponentially fast. Combining
this assumption with the fact that ρ(A¯pp) < 1, we conclude
that for every k ∈ Jp, there exists a y∗k ∈ Rn such that
limt→∞ yk(t) = y
∗
k exponentially fast.
The invariance property in which ypi (0) ∈ [−1, 1] for all
i ∈ I and p ∈ J implies ypi (t) ∈ [−1, 1] for all t ≥ 0 and
i ∈ I and p ∈ J was proved in [20], using the fact that∑n
q=1 |cpq,i| = 1 as detailed in Assumption 1.
B. Analysis for Subsection III-B
Here, we present a supporting result that links the struc-
tural balance of the graph G[A] to the structural balance of
G[Ci], i ∈ I, which will be used to help prove the main result
on consensus for irreducible Ci.
First, we introduce additional graph-theoretic concepts. For
a given (possibly signed) graph G, an undirected cycle is a
cycle of G that ignores the direction of the edges, and an
undirected cycle is negative if it contains an odd number
of edges with negative edge weight. A signed graph G is
structurally unbalanced if and only if it has at least one
negative undirected cycle [29].
We now establish several additional properties of how the
entries cij,k of Ck relate to edges in G[A].
Lemma 4. For the graph G[A] with node set V[A] =
{v1, . . . , vnm}, let Vp = {v(p−1)n+1, . . . , vpn}, p ∈ J be
defined as the set of nodes of the subgraph G[App]. Suppose
that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. Then,
1) For every p ∈ J , G[App] is strongly connected and
aperiodic with positive edge weights.
2) There is an edge from node v(q−1)n+j to v(p−1)n+i if and
only if wij > 0 and cpq,i 6= 0. Moreover, the weight of
the edge the same sign as the sign of cpq,i.
3) If cpq,k 6= 0∀ k ∈ I, then with p 6= q, every node in Vp
has an incoming edge from a node Vq , and every node
in Vq has an outgoing edge to a node in Vp.
Proof. First, recall that Apq , diag(cpq)W as below Eq. (9).
Item 1): From Assumption 1, we know that cpp,i > 0∀ i ∈ I
and p ∈ J . This implies that App ∼ W and App ≥ 0 with
all positive diagonals, which implies that G[App] is strongly
connected and aperiodic.
Item 2): Notice that Apq is nonzero if and only if cpq,i 6=
0, i ∈ I. Moreover, the ijth entry of a nonzero Apq is nonzero
if and only if wij > 0, and has the same sign as cpq,i. Recall
that we defined node subsets Vp = {v(p−1)n+1, . . . , vpn},
p ∈ J for the graph G[A]. It follows that an edge from
node v(q−1)n+j ∈ Vq to v(p−1)n+i ∈ Vp exists if and only
if wij > 0 and cpq,i 6= 0, and has the same sign as cpq,i.
Item 3): This statement is obtained by (i) recalling the
definition of the node set Vp = {v(p−1)n+1, . . . , vpn}, p ∈ J ,
(ii) observing that an irreducible W implies that for any i ∈ I,
there exists a j ∈ I, i 6= j such that wij > 0, and (iii) by
applying Item 2).
We now turn to study of the structural balance of G[A] and
its relation to the structural balance of the G[Ci]s.
Lemma 5. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold.
Suppose further that Ci for all i ∈ I are irreducible. The
following hold:
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1) If there are no individuals with competing logical in-
terdependencies, as given in Definition 1, then G[A] is
structurally balanced if and only if G[Ci],∀ i ∈ I are
structurally balanced.
2) If there are individuals with competing logical interde-
pendences, then G[A] is structurally unbalanced.
Proof. We prove each statement separately.
Part 1: Consider the case where there are no individu-
als with competing logical interdependencies. Since, for any
p, q ∈ J , cpq,i for all i ∈ I are of the same sign, it follows
that all graphs G[Ci] have the same structural balance or
unbalance property. Moreover, because the structural balance
or unbalance property of any graph depends on the sign, and
not the magnitude, of its edge weights, let us consider G[C1]
for convenience. For brevity, we also drop the subscript 1 and
simply write G[C] for Part 1 of this proof, with node set
VC = {vc,1, . . . , vc,m}. To establish the result, we will exploit
Lemma 4. For each p ∈ J , consider the subgraph G[App] of
G[A]. Item 1) of Lemma 4 tells us that every edge in G[App]
has a positive weight, while Item 2) and Item 3) of Lemma 4
establish that the edge weights for all edges from G[Aqq] to
G[App] have the same sign as the sign of the weight for the
edge (vc,q, vc,p) in G[C].
With these properties in mind, consider a structurally unbal-
anced G[C]; since G[C] is strongly connected, the unbalance
property implies there is at least one negative directed cycle.
Without loss of generality, consider the negative cycle
(vc,p, vc,z1), (vc,z1 , vc,z2), . . . (vc,zr , vc,p) (23)
with z1, . . . zr ∈ J and r ≥ 1. Let u ∈ N be the odd number
of negative edges in the undirected cycle. From Item 2) and
3) of Lemma 4, and using the fact that wii > 0 ∀ i ∈ I, we
find that there is an undirected cycle in G[A] given as
pi =(v(p−1)n+i, v(z1−1)n+i), (v(z1−1)n+i, v(z2−1)n+i), . . . ,
(v(zr)n+i, v(p−1)n+i).
The undirected cycle pi contains precisely u edges with nega-
tive weight, which implies that pi is a negative cycle. It follows
that G[A] is structurally unbalanced.
Next, consider a structurally balanced G[C], and assume
without loss of generality that the nodes are ordered such that
they can be partitioned into disjoint sets V+ = {vc,1, . . . , vc,s}
and V− = {vc,s+1, . . . , vc,m}, with 1 ≤ s < m. The two sets
have the property that each edge between two nodes in V+ or
V− has positive weight, while each edge between a node in
V+ and a node in V− has negative weight. Without loss of
generality, consider an undirected cycle, pi, in G[A] starting
and ending at a node v¯ in the subgraph G[A11]. We are going
to show that any such pi is not a negative undirected cycle. If
pi traverses only nodes in G[A11], then clearly all edges on the
path have positive weight. Suppose instead that pi is such that
it traverses at least one node in each of the subgraphs G[A11],
G[Az1z1 ], . . . ,G[Azrzr ], with z1, . . . zr ∈ J and r ≥ 1 (by the
definition of an undirected cycle, each node in the cycle apart
from v¯ is distinct). If vc,z1 , . . . , vc,zr ∈ V+, then we conclude
from Item 2) and 3) of Lemma 4 that all edges in pi have
positive weight. In both cases, pi is not a negative undirected
cycle. Now suppose that z1, . . . zk, with k < r, are such that
vc,z1 , . . . vc,zk ∈ V−. Notice that for any two nodes v˜ and
vˆ in the subgraphs G[App], p ∈ {1, . . . , s}, a path from v˜ to
vˆ which traverses nodes in the subgraphs G[Aqq], q ∈ {s +
1, . . . ,m} has an even number of edges with negative weight.
This is because vc,p ∈ V+, p ∈ {1, . . . , s} and vc,q ∈ V−, q ∈
{s+1, . . . ,m}. From the fact that v¯ ∈ G[A11], one can use this
previous property to show that there exist nonnegative integers
u1, . . . , uk such that the number of edges in pi with negative
weight is precisely
∑k
v=1 2uv + 2. It follows that there are
an even number of edges with negative weight in pi, meaning
pi is not a negative undirected cycle. This analysis holds for
every undirected cycle in G[A]. We conclude that there does
not exist a negative undirected cycle in G[A], which implies
that G[A] is structurally balanced.
We have thus proved that there exists an undirected negative
cycle in G[A] if and only if there exists an undirected
negative cycle in G[C], which implies the structural balance
or unbalance of G[A] is the same as that of G[Ci],∀ i ∈ I.
Part 2: Consider now the case when there are individuals
with competing logical interdependencies. Suppose that there
exist individuals j, k such that cpq,j > 0 and cpq,k < 0 has
negative sign (i.e. there are competing logical interdependen-
cies in topic p). From Item 1) of Lemma 4, we know that the
subgraph G[App] is strongly connected and all edges between
nodes within G[App] have positive weight. From Item 2) and
Item 3) of Lemma 4, and because wii > 0 for all i, we observe
that G[A] has an undirected cycle
(v(q−1)n+j , v(p−1)n+j), (v(p−1)n+j , v(p−1)n+z1), . . . ,
(v(p−1)n+zr , v(p−1)n+k), (v(p−1)n+k, v(q−1)n+k),
(v(q−1)n+k, v(q−1)n+zr ), . . . , (v(q−1)n+z1 , v(q−1)n+j)
with z1, . . . zr ∈ I and r ≥ 1. The single negative edge in this
undirected cycle is (v(p−1)n+k, v(q−1)n+k), which means the
undirected cycle is negative. It follows that G[A] is structurally
unbalanced.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
We first prove Statement 1). If there are no competing
logical interdependencies and G[Ci],∀ i ∈ I are structurally
balanced, then G[A] is structurally balanced according to
Lemma 5. According to [11, Theorem 1], for almost all initial
conditions the system Eq. (10) converges to a nonzero modulus
consensus, i.e. limt→∞ |yip(t)| = |yjq(t)| 6= 0 for all i, j ∈ I
and p, q ∈ J . It remains to prove that limt→∞ yk(t) =
αk1n,∀k ∈ J .
For a structurally balanced G[A], the nodes vi ∈ V can be
partitioned into two disjoint sets V+ and V−, where every
edge between nodes in the same set has positive weight, and
every edge between nodes of V+ and V− has negative weight.
Item 1) of Lemma 4 implies that for any k ∈ J , the nodes
v(k−1)n+1, . . . , vkn all belong in either V+ or V−. Recalling
that the node v(k−1)n+i corresponds to the variable yik, and
from [11, Theorem 1], it follows that limt→∞ yik(t) = y
j
k(t)
for all i, j ∈ I, and thus limt→∞ yk = αk1n for every k ∈ J .
Statements 2) and 3) can be proved simultaneously. If there
are no competing logical interdependencies, and G[Ci],∀ i ∈
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I are structurally unbalanced then according to Lemma 5,
G[A] is structurally unbalanced. Similarly, if there are com-
peting logical interdependencies, then according to Lemma 5,
G[A] is also structurally unbalanced. From [11, Theorem 2],
there holds limt→∞ y(t) = 0nm exponentially fast. This
completes the proof of the theorem.
D. Proof of Corollary 1
Recall from Appendix B that the structural balance or
unbalance property of any graph depends on the sign, and not
the magnitude, of its edge weights. Since G[Ci],∀ i ∈ I are
structurally balanced, we can consider G[C1] for convenience.
For brevity, we also drop the subscript 1 and simply write
G[C]. Partition the nodes v1, . . . , vm of G[C] into two disjoint
sets V[C]+ and V[C]− such that every edge between nodes
in the same set has positive weight, and every edge between
nodes of different sets has negative weight.
Since G[A] is structurally balanced, let us also partition the
nodes v˜k of G[A] into two disjoint sets V+ and V− such that
every edge between nodes in the same set has positive weight,
and every edge between nodes of different sets has negative
weight. We know from Lemma 4 Item 1) and Lemma 5 that
the nodes v˜(p−1)n+1, . . . , v˜pn of G[A] all belong in either V+
or V−. Recall from Item 2) and 3) of Lemma 4 that the weights
of the edges from subgraph G[Aqq] to subgraph G[App], with
p 6= q and p, q ∈ J , have the same sign as the edges in
G[C] from vq to vp. One can then use the analysis in [11] and
Theorem 3, Statement 1), to verify that αp = αq if vp and vq
are either both in V[C]+ or both in V[C]−. If, on the other
hand, vq ∈ V[C]+ and vp ∈ V[C]−, then αp = −αq .
E. Proof of Theorem 4
First, observe that if Jj = {p} is a singleton, then the
block diagonal matrix A¯pp in Eq. (21) is in fact A¯pp =
App = diag(cpp)W , where diag(cpq), p, q ∈ J is defined
below Eq. (9). Since 0 < cpp,i < 1 for all i ∈ I, and W is
row-stochastic, we have that ‖App‖∞ < 1 ⇒ ρ(App) < 1.
This implies that (In −App)−1 exists. Letting Jˆp be the set
of topics that topic p logically depends upon, as defined in
Eq. (13), the vector yp(t) converges exponentially fast to
lim
t→∞yp(t) , y
∗
p = (In −App)−1
( ∑
j∈Jˆp
Apjy
∗
j
)
. (24)
We now focus on proving that y∗p reaches a consensus state if
and only if Eq. (14) holds for some αp ∈ [−1, 1]. Let Rpp =
In−App, and because W is row-stochastic, one obtains that
Apq1n = diag(cpq)1n for any q, p ∈ J and Rpp1n = (In −
diag(cpp))1n. We use this observation several times below.
Sufficiency: Because Jj = {p}, we can obtain from Eq. (11)
that cpq,i = 0 for every q > p. Combining this with
Assumption 1 yields 1 − cpp,i =
∑
q∈Jˆp |cpq,i|. This implies
that if there exists a κ ∈ [−1, 1] satisfying Eq. (14) for
all i ∈ I, then ∑q∈Jˆp αq diag(cpq) = κ(In − diag(cpp)).
Recalling that by the theorem hypothesis y∗q = αq1n for every
q ∈ Jˆp, Eq. (24) then yields
y∗p = R
−1
pp
( ∑
q∈Jˆp
αq diag(cpq)
)
1n = κ1n.
This also shows that αp = κ.
Necessity: Suppose in order to obtain a contradiction, that
y∗p = αp1n for some αp and there does not exist a κ ∈ [−1, 1]
satisfying Eq. (14) for all i ∈ I. Substituting y∗p = αp1n into
the left hand side of Eq. (24), we obtain
αp1n = R
−1
pp
( ∑
q∈Jˆp
αq diag(cpq)
)
1n
Multiplying both sides by Rpp yields
αp(In − diag(cpp))1n =
( ∑
q∈Jˆp
αq diag(cpq)
)
1n. (25)
However, Eq. (25) implies that for all i ∈ I, there holds
αp
∑
q∈Jˆp
|cpq,i| =
∑
q∈Jˆp
αqcpq,i. (26)
Clearly, this contradicts the assumption made at the start of the
proof of necessity: there does not exist a κ ∈ [−1, 1] satisfying
Eq. (14) for all i ∈ I. This completes the proof.
F. Proof of Corollary 2
We prove each statement of Corollary 2 separately. First,
note that |αq| ≤ 1, which implies that the quantity on the
right hand side of Eq. (14) is in [−1, 1] for every i ∈ I.
Statement 1): For the proof of sufficiency, suppose that there
are no competing logical interdependencies in topic p. Then,
αqcpq,i has the same sign for every i ∈ I and since Jˆp =
{q}, κ = αq sgn(cpq,i) ∈ [−1, 1] satisfies Eq. (14), where the
signum function sgn : R→ {−1, 0, 1} satisfies sgn(x) = 1 if
x > 0, sgn(x) = 0 if x = 0, and sgn(x) = −1 if x < 0.
For the proof of necessity, suppose that there are competing
logical interdependencies in topic p, and suppose cpq,1 > 0
and cpq,2 < 0 (see below Eq. (7) on why we can make this
assumption without loss of generality). Then, sgn(αqcpq,1) =
− sgn(αqcpq,2), which implies that there does not exist a κ
such that Eq. (14) simultaneously holds for i = 1 and i = 2.
Statement 2): The proof is trivial, since the right hand side
of Eq. (14) is zero for all i ∈ I.
Statement 3): The condition cpqk,i = cpqk,j = cpqk for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , r} and i, j ∈ I implies that∑
q∈Jˆp αqcpq,i∑
q∈Jˆp |cpq,i|
=
∑
q∈Jˆp αqcpq,j∑
q∈Jˆp |cpq,j |
(27)
for any i, j ∈ I, which means that a κ ∈ [−1, 1] exists
satisfying Eq. (14) for all i ∈ I.
Statement 4): Observe that proving the existence of a κ ∈
[−1, 1] satisfying Eq. (14) is equivalent to finding a κ ∈ [−1, 1]
such that
r∑
k=1
αqkzk = κ
r∑
k=1
Ξkzk (28)
where zk = [cpqk,1, . . . , cpqk,n]
>, and Ξk is a diagonal matrix
with ith diagonal entry being sgn(cpqk,i). Because we assumed
that |αqu | = |αqv | for all u, v ∈ {1, . . . , r}, let α¯ , |αqk |.
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In the case of (i), where sgn(cpqk,i) = sgn(αqk) for every
k ∈ {1, . . . , r}, it follows that αqkzk = α¯Ξkzk. Rearranging
Eq. (28) yields
0n =
r∑
k=1
(κ− α¯)Ξkzk. (29)
Since α¯ ∈ [−1, 1], choosing κ = α¯ ensures that Eq. (28)
holds. The proof for case (ii) is the same, except that αqkzk =
−α¯Ξkzk and one selects κ = −α¯ to satisfy Eq. (28).
G. Proof of Theorem 5
First, note that for any p, q ∈ J , Apq1n = diag(cpq)1n,
where diag(cpq) has been defined below Eq. (9). For notational
convenience, let Jj = {k1, . . . , ksj} with sj ≥ 2. In other
words, we replace for brevity
∑j
i=1 si−1 + p in Eq. (12) with
kp, for p = 1, . . . , sj . We proved in Theorem 2 that ρ(A¯jj) <
1 for every j ∈ S which, combined with the assumption that
y∗q = αq1n, αq ∈ [−1, 1] for all q ∈ J˜j , yields
 y
∗
k1
...
y∗ksj
 = (Insj − A¯jj)−1

∑
q∈J˜j
αq diag(ck1q)1n
...∑
q∈J˜j
αq diag(cksj q)1n
 (30)
where y∗k = limt→∞ yk(t) for k ∈ Jj .
Sufficiency: Observe that, for any k ∈ Jj , there holds∑
r∈Jj\{k}
|ckr,i|+
∑
q∈J˜j
|ckq,i| = 1− ckk,i. (31)
This implies that if there exist φk ∈ [−1, 1] such that Eq. (16)
holds for every k ∈ Jj and i ∈ I, then
φk(1− ckk,i)−
∑
r∈Jj\{k}
φrckr,i =
∑
q∈J˜j
αqckq,i. (32)
One can verify that Eq. (32) holding for every k ∈ Jj and
i ∈ I is equivalent to the following equality:
(Insj − C¯)(Φ⊗ In)1nsj =

∑
q∈J˜j
αq diag(ck1q)1n
...∑
q∈J˜j
αq diag(cksj q)1n
 (33)
where Φ ∈ Rsj is a diagonal matrix with ith diagonal entry
φki and
C¯ =
 diag(ck1k1) . . . diag(ck1ksj )... . . . ...
diag(cksj k1) . . . diag(cksj ksj )
 . (34)
Next, observe that
C¯(Φ⊗ In)(1sj ⊗ 1n) = C¯(Φ⊗W )(1sj ⊗ 1n)
= C¯(Isj ⊗W )(Φ⊗ In)(1sj ⊗ 1n)
= A¯jj(Φ⊗ In)(1sj ⊗ 1n) (35)
with the first equality obtained by recalling that W1n = 1n,
and the last equality obtained by verifying from Eq. (22) that
A¯jj , C¯(Isj ⊗W ). Returning to Eq. (30), it follows that y
∗
k1
...
y∗ksj
 = (Insj − A¯jj)−1(Insj − C¯)(Φ⊗ In)1nsj
= (Φ⊗ In)1nsj , (36)
with the first equality obtained by substituting in the left hand
side of Eq. (33), and the last equality obtained from Eq. (35).
It follows that y∗k = φk1n for every k ∈ Jj .
Necessity: To obtain a contradiction, suppose that for every
p ∈ {1, . . . , sj}, (i) there do not exist φk1 , . . . , φksj ∈ [−1, 1]
such that Eq. (16) holds for all i ∈ I, and (ii) there holds
y∗kp = αkp1n for some αkp ∈ [−1, 1]. Note that αkp ∈ [−1, 1]
is a consequence of the invariance property of Eq. (10) (see
Theorem 2). Eq. (30) yields
αk11n...
αksj 1n
 = (Insj−A¯jj)−1

∑
q∈J˜j
αi diag(ck1q)1n
...∑
q∈J˜j
αq diag(cksj q)1n
 (37)
Let α¯ be a diagonal matrix with ith diagonal entry αki .
Recalling that A¯jj , C¯(Isj ⊗W ), we multiply both sides
of Eq. (37) by Insj − A¯jj . Simplifying using calculations
similar to those appearing in Eq. (35) but with α¯ replacing
Φ, we obtain
(Insj − C¯)(α¯⊗ In)1nsj =

∑
q∈J˜j
αq diag(ck1q)1n
...∑
q∈J˜j
αq diag(cksj q)1n
 (38)
Notice that Eq. (38) is equivalent to
αk(1− ckk,i)−
∑
r∈Jj\{k}
αrckr,i =
∑
q∈J˜j
αqckq,i (39)
holding for all k ∈ Jj and i ∈ I. Using the equality in
Eq. (31), observe that Eq. (39) is in turn equal to
αk(
∑
r∈Jj\{k}
|ckr,i|+
∑
q∈J˜j
|ckq,i|)
=
∑
r∈Jj\{k}
αrckr,i +
∑
q∈J˜j
αqckq,i. (40)
However, Eq. (40) contradicts the assumption made at the
start of this (necessity) part of the proof: there do no exist
φk1 , . . . , φksj ∈ [−1, 1] such that Eq. (16) holds for every
kp ∈ Jj and i ∈ I. This completes the proof.
H. Proof of Corollary 3
We prove each item separately.
Item 1: This result can be immediately obtained by checking
Eq. (16) with αq = 0 for all q ∈ J˜j .
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Item 2: First, note that Ci is of the form in Eq. (11), which
implies that cka,i = 0 for all k ∈ Jj , a > maxJj , and i ∈ I.
Let A¯jj be defined as in Eq. (22). Similar to the proof of
Theorem 5, let Jj = {k1, . . . , ksj} with sj ≥ 2. Supposing
that there holds ckp,g = ckp,h = ckp for k ∈ Jj and p ∈ J ,
define
C¯ =
 ck1k1 . . . ck1ksj... . . . ...
cksj k1 . . . cksj ksj
 . (41)
Then, I−A¯jj = Insj−C¯⊗W . Since ρ(A¯jj) < 1, we obtain
from the Neumann series that (I − A¯jj)−1 =
∑∞
t=0 A¯jj
t
=∑∞
t=0 C¯
t⊗W t. Let |C¯| be the matrix whose ijth entry is the
absolute value of the ijth entry of C¯. Assumption 1 and the
fact that J˜j 6= ∅ implies that |C¯| is row-substochastic. Using
calculations similar to those at the end of Appendix A, one
can show that ρ(C¯) < 1, which establishes the existence of∑∞
t=0 C¯
t.
Define for p ∈ {1, . . . sj}, α˜kp =
∑
q∈J˜j αqckpq , and
observe that 
∑
q∈J˜j
αq diag(ck1q)1n
...∑
q∈J˜j
αq diag(cksj q)1n
 = α˜⊗ 1n, (42)
where α˜ = [α˜k1 , . . . , α˜ksj ]
>. We obtain from Eq. (30) that y
∗
k1
...
y∗ksj
=( ∞∑
t=0
C¯
t ⊗W t
)
α˜⊗ 1n=
( ∞∑
t=0
C¯
t
α˜
)
⊗ 1n
(43)
since W t is a row-stochastic matrix for any t ∈ N. We have
thus concluded that the right hand side of Eq. (43) is equal to
u⊗1n for u =
∑∞
t=0 C¯
t
α˜ ∈ Rsj . This implies that for every
k ∈ Jj , we have y∗k = αk1n for some αk ∈ [−1, 1].
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